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ABSTRACT: This article explores whether new arenas of engagement for water governance have been created and 
utilised following the implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in large hydropower projects 
in Vietnam. Initial optimism for climate finance – in particular amongst Northern aid providers and private CDM 
consultants – resulted in a boom in registration of CDM hydropower projects in Vietnam. These plans, however, 
have since then busted. The article utilises a multi-scale and multi-place network governance analysis of the water 
governance-climate finance nexus, based on interviews with government officials, consultants, developers, NGOs, 
multilateral and international banks, and project-affected people at the Song Bung 2 and Song Bung 4 hydropower 
projects in Central Vietnam. Particular attention is paid to how the place-based nature of organisations shapes the 
ability of these actors to participate in decision-making. The article concludes that the CDM has had little impact 
on water governance in Vietnam at the project level in terms of carbon reduction (additionality) or attaining 
sustainable development objectives. Furthermore, whilst climate finance has the potential to open new, more 
transparent and more accountable arenas of water governance, current arenas of the water governance-climate 
finance nexus are 'rendered technical', and therefore often underutilised and inaccessible to civil society and 
project-affected people. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The increasing importance of climate change as a global problem has led to renewed opportunities for 
large hydropower development. Climate change-related finance mechanisms have proven to be a new 
avenue for the funding of hydropower. In this article, we seek to address how climate finance 
mechanisms interact with water governance, which is an issue that has received limited academic 
attention. 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the flexible climate finance mechanisms under 
the Kyoto protocol, which was adopted in 1997 and came into effect in 2005. CDM allows private 
companies in 'developed' or Annex-1 countries1 to meet their climate targets by buying carbon offsets – 
                                                          
1
 Annex 1 countries are the countries with binding emission targets under the original Kyoto protocol. Non-Annex 1 countries 
are the other countries. 
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i.e. investing in clean technology – from private-sector projects in 'developing' or non-Annex-1 
countries. The number of projects registered through this mechanism has exceeded the expectations of 
CDMʼs supporters and critics alike with over 7200 projects registered by September 2013. This includes 
around 2000 hydropower projects, constituting the second most important technology in terms of 
number of projects, but with the highest number of Certified Emission Reductions (CER)2 (UNEP Risoe, 
2013).3 This article focuses on hydropower CDM projects in Vietnam, as it has the highest number of 
hydropower CDM projects in the Greater Mekong Subregion (Figure 1Figure). 
Figure 1. Number of registered CDM projects in the Greater Mekong Subregion by country and type per 
September 2013. 
 
Source: UNEP Risoe (2013). 
The CDM has been subject to substantial criticism, mainly focused on the twin objectives of the CDM: 
(1) 'additionality', or whether a project would not be built without CDM funding; and (2) whether it 
contributes to 'sustainable development' in the 'host' developing country (Paulsson, 2009; Subbarao 
and Lloyd, 2011; Newell, 2011). Hydropower projects in particular have been criticised as often non-
additional and with large social and environmental impacts, such as resettlement, flooding of 
agricultural lands, and degradation of ecosystems (Haya, 2009; Haya and Parekh, 2011; Cole and 
Roberts, 2011; CDM Watch, 2012). This article extends the critique of CDM by assessing its contribution 
to water governance and thereby fills a crucial gap in the understanding of 'global governance' 
mechanisms and their grounding in local contexts. It does so by mapping the boom and bust of 
hydropower CDM in Vietnam, and by evaluating in detail two local case studies in Quang Nam Province. 
While Vietnam has the third highest number of registered hydropower CDM projects in the world, it has 
gained limited attention compared to China (number one) and India (number two). This research is 
timely, given the current uncertainty and ongoing negotiations over the successor to the Kyoto protocol 
and the many new experiments with carbon finance mechanisms currently underway (Newell et al., 
                                                          
2
 1 CER equals 1 tonne of CO2. 
3
 The technology with the highest number of projects is wind energy. 
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2013; Ecofys, 2013). Many of these will have direct or indirect impacts on governance processes in 
different domains, including water governance.  
In this article, water governance is conceptualised as 
comprising all social, political, economic and administrative organisations and institutions, as well as their 
relationships to water resources development and management. It is concerned with how institutions 
operate and how regulations affect political actions and societal concerns through formal and informal 
instruments (Tortajada, 2010: 299). 
In order to understand the articulation of water governance with climate finance mechanisms, we 
stress that CDM not only involves multi-scale governance processes, but also multi-place processes. We 
draw on the framework of Dore et al. (2012) to apply the concept of water governance 'arenas' which 
can be defined as physical or virtual places where actors meet and governance decisions take shape, 
and that are infused with politics and asymmetrical power relations. We aim to investigate whether in 
Vietnam, where there are limited opportunities for freedom of expression, additional governance 
processes for hydropower such as the CDM could hold the potential – in principle – to offer new arenas 
for affected communities, civil society and other actors wanting to engage within water governance 
decision-making. 
Water governance in Vietnam is highly contested and has changed dramatically in the last few 
decades, due both to the extensive construction of dams for hydropower or irrigation, and wider 
economic, social and political transformations. The Vietnamese government has constructed 500 dams, 
weirs and sluices between 1959 and 1999, and several hundreds more since the start of this millennium 
(Dao, 2010). While this has led to more irrigation, flood protection and opportunities for power 
generation, this has also had direct and indirect impacts on peoplesʼ livelihoods in dam-affected areas, 
such as reduced availability of agricultural land, the emergence of new forms of inequality between the 
centre and the periphery, and between the ethnic majority and minorities more generally (Dao, 2011). 
Hydroelectric power has been a key source of electricity production in Vietnam since World War II; it 
was the main source of electricity until the 1990s and was responsible for 29% of Vietnamʼs electricity 
mix in 2010 (IEA, 2010). In other words, long before the CDM was in place, Vietnam had already 
embarked on an energy strategy heavily focused on the exploitation of its domestic hydropower 
potential (Middleton et al., 2009). The late 2000s and early 2010s saw another wave of hydropower 
development in Vietnam with thousands of megawatts of hydropower added to the countryʼs 
production capacity. This was largely driven by the opening up of the country for domestic and 
international Independent Power Producers (IPPs), as a first step towards the World Bankʼs supported 
goal of full privatisation and a competitive electricity wholesale and retail market (World Bank, 2010, 
2012). 
While the CDM was introduced around the same time as the second hydropower boom, we argue in 
this article that this hydropower boom occurred irrespective of the CDM, although the governance of 
hydropower in Vietnam did shape the boom (and bust) of CDM in the country. This article reveals that 
CDM has had a limited impact on water governance in Vietnam because (1) most projects would have 
gone ahead without CDM financing anyway (essentially making them non-additional, and therefore in 
principle ineligible for CDM financing), and (2) the CDMʼs sustainable development objectives are 
unclear and left to the discretion of developers and consultants, making it difficult to 'ground' CDM. We 
conclude that while CDM has opened some new – and perhaps unexpected – arenas of engagement, 
these spaces are not available to all actors, because they require expert knowledge and are thus 
'rendered technical' (Li, 2011). Whether the CDM and future climate finance mechanisms might 
contribute towards strengthened water governance depends in part on the opening up of these spaces 
to the voice of local civil society organisations and affected communities. 
Water Alternatives - 2014  Volume 7 | Issue 3 
Smits and Middleton: The boom and bust of hydropower CDM projects in Vietnam Page | 564 
The next section outlines the conceptual framework of this article, followed by the methodology. 
Subsequently, the boom and bust of the CDM in Vietnam are analysed, before applying the conceptual 
framework to hydropower CDM in Vietnam in the next few empirical sections. The penultimate section 
discusses new arenas of engagement, followed by the conclusions. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ARTICULATION OF CDM AND WATER GOVERNANCE 
This article seeks to understand how water governance articulates with the CDM, in particular how 
CDM projects are evaluated and approved. The conceptual framework of this article draws upon a 
framework developed by Dore et al. (2012) (Figure 2Figure). According to the authors, this framework 
assists our understanding of engagement and decision-making involving socially complex water. Each 
heading and sub-heading in the framework acts as a prompt to the analyst to take stock of the situation 
being assessed and reflect on key aspects. The framework acknowledges the centrality of power and 
politics but is not subsumed by these topics. Context, drivers, arenas, tools, decisions and impacts all 
matter (p. 33). 
Below, we describe the usage of the framework through a short description of how each of the 
frameworkʼs boxes in Figure 2 relates to CDM. The brief analysis demonstrates that the CDM – and 
climate finance more generally – are more than a financial incentive, but are embedded in many 
aspects of water governance, and, more broadly, within national and local sociocultural, political-
administrative structures and political cultures of Vietnam. In other words, the sustainable 
development goals of CDM simply cannot – and do not – override the existing rules, regulations and 
practices related to hydropower construction and operation, for example, surface water use, 
Environmental Impact Assessment, or resettlement practices. 
Figure 2. Framework for analysing water governance. Reproduced from Dore et al. (2012). 
 
The context consists of elements such as the biophysical phenomenon of climate change and associated 
changes and uncertainty in the hydrological regime. This has led to the development of new drivers, 
such as new institutions (e.g. the rules of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)), new interests (e.g. the creation of carbon markets) and new discourses (a growing pressure 
for low-carbon growth and global climate change mitigation activities). Tools include technical 
assessments, which are conducted at multiple levels and a limited number of mechanisms for public 
consultation. Arenas are places where new configurations of actors meet, either physically or virtually, 
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leading to changing power relations and political outcomes or decisions. For CDM, a key decision is 
whether or not the project qualifies for carbon finance based on the CDMʼs criteria, finally leading to 
certain impacts which according to the objectives of CDM should be 'additionality' and 'sustainable 
development'. Other possible water governance impacts could be participation, transparency, and fair 
allocation of costs, benefits and risks. 
In this article, we focus in particular on arenas which can be simultaneously multi-scale and multi-
place. Table 1 provides an overview of the main CDM-related arenas, the actors, their physical 
characteristics and types of decisions. 
Table 1. Overview of CDM-related arenas and 'scales'. 
Arena/ 
'scale' 
Actors involved Physical characteristics of 
the arena (place-based) 
Types of decisions and 
power 
'Global' UNFCCC (CDM Executive 
Board), Designated 
Operational Entities,4 
international consultants 
Office buildings in Bonn 
and other capital cities; 
Internet (as global public 
sphere) 
CDM rules and regulations, 
additionality, global 
approval 
'National'  Designated National 
Authority (DNA), 
international and national 
consultants 
Office buildings and 
ministries in big cities 
Sustainable development 
criteria, host approval 
'Local' Project developers, local 
authorities, affected 
people 
Project offices, provincial 
and district government 
offices, villages  
Consultation meetings 
(passive) 
We place scale in quotation marks in Table 1 to stress the place-based nature of these arenas. In other 
words, whilst these arenas may be interpreted as operating at a particular scale, they are 
simultaneously place-based. The UNFCCC, for example, is a global institution based in Bonn. The 
Internet is also an increasingly important part of the 'global arena', in particular for global governance 
mechanisms such as CDM. In the case of the CDM, for example, some project documents (in English) 
are posted to the UNFCCC website for a 30-day comment period. Like other arenas, access to the 
Internet is mediated by material constraints (e.g. having a computer with Internet access) and 
knowledge constraints (e.g. understanding English and the CDM methodologies). Meanwhile, many 
national-level governance processes take place within office buildings in national capitals. Local arenas, 
on the other hand, might consist of local government offices or village meeting places. This use of scale 
espouses a relational definition of scale, rather than one related to size, level or nested hierarchy 
(Marston et al., 2005; Sayre, 2009). 
The characteristics of each of these arenas – as physical and/or virtual places – profoundly influence 
the ability of actors to engage with these arenas, either positively or negatively. With this focus on 
arenas, we find it helpful to extend the framework by incorporating two additional concepts: network 
governance and 'rendering technical'. 
Network governance refers to new and loose modes of governance involving a mix of public, private 
and civil society actors (Khan, 2010). Climate governance mechanisms, such as CDM, are a key example 
of this new form of governance, in which governments are no longer solely in charge of governing, but 
                                                          
4
 Designated Operational Entities are private entities involved in (1) validating projects for CDM registration and (2) verifying 
the emission reductions once the CDM project is running. 
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do so in partnership with the private sector and civil society organisations amongst many others 
(Bäckstrand, 2008). Network governance emphasises that the governance of certain places or place-
based activities can be dependent on governance processes which are based in other places that can be 
physically very far away. While improved telecommunication and faster rates of travel are key drivers 
that facilitate networked governance, we argue that the impact of distance remains a crucial factor 
mediating the ability of actors to engage in arenas of water governance because not all actors have 
access to the same telecommunication resources or the ability to travel with ease. Furthermore, other 
organisational factors, such as power asymmetries, organisational culture and working language, also 
play a role. 
The second concept is that of 'rendering technical' (Li, 2007, 2011), described by Mosse (2013) as 
"conceiving and rearranging social relations and inherently political processes in alignment with expert 
designs" (p. 229). The CDM process does just this, turning a heterogeneous and messy reality of carbon 
emissions into quantifiable and accountable units of CO2 through complex methodologies that require 
specific skills and knowledge (Bumpus, 2011; Lansing, 2012). The effect of this rendering technical is 
that certain actors are able to enter and engage within certain arenas, while others cannot, depending 
on their level of power and knowledge. 
METHODOLOGY 
Data were collected through desk-based research and fieldwork in Vietnam, covering most of the scales 
described in the previous section. Literature was reviewed for the current debates about CDM in 
general, for the Greater Mekong Subregion, and for Vietnam in particular. Descriptive statistics about 
the numbers and types of CDM projects in these countries were generated from United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP Risoe (2013). In addition, grey literature and websites were consulted 
to match the official CDM data with actual project developments and other relevant information on 
CDM. 
Fieldwork was carried out in two locations. Two field trips to Hanoi were undertaken as one of the 
key arenas of CDM identified in the previous section, in October 2012 and August 2013. During these 
field trips, a total of 22 qualitative interviews were conducted with the Designated National Authority 
(DNA), consultancy companies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and an 
international bank, to discuss issues pertaining to water governance and CDM in Vietnam. The content 
of the interviews varied considerably, depending on the type of actor. Further information was 
collected through follow-up emails and return visits. Additional fieldwork was undertaken in Central 
Vietnam in August 2013, focusing on two specific hydropower projects – Song Bung 2 and Song Bung 4 
– both located in Nam Giang District, Quang Nam Province, and both involving Electricité du Vietnam 
(EVN). Interviews were held with the Management boards of both companies in Danang and with 
different departments of the provincial and district government authorities in Quang Nam. Both 
construction sites were visited, in order to talk to engineers, construction workers and resettled or 
otherwise affected people in four communities. Altogether approximately 20 such talks were held – 
most of them informal – in order to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy and potentially 'scripted' answers. 
THE BOOM AND BUST OF CDM IN VIETNAM 
This section presents a chronological story of the boom and bust of CDM in Vietnam. While we refer 
mainly to hydropower CDM, many of the observations also apply for CDM in Vietnam in general and 
even globally. We distinguish three phases of development: the start-up phase (2000-2008), the take-
off phase (2008-2013) and the recent collapse (from 2013 onwards). Figure 3Figure shows these three 
phases for hydropower CDM projects. 
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Figure 3. The number of registered and approved hydropower CDM projects in Vietnam over time until 
1 October 2013. Data from UNEP Risoe (2013). 
 
Start-up phase (2002-2008) 
Vietnam ratified the Kyoto protocol in 2002, but the CDM in Vietnam started slowly, despite large 
amounts of financial and capacity-building support from donor countries and multilateral banks. 
Northern donors and the UN carried out several capacity-building projects for consultancy companies 
and the Government of Vietnam, as Vietnam was seen as a country with good potential for CDM. For 
example, the consultancy company RCEE-NIRAS5 was involved in 15 different capacity-building projects 
on CDM potential from 2002 onwards, funded by a diverse set of actors, such as the World Bank, ADB, 
UNDP, UNEP, United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), DANIDA (Denmarkʼs 
development cooperation), Development Bank of Japan, the German and Australian Government and 
others (RCEE-NIRAS, 2012). Besides these bilateral projects, Vietnam has also been involved in a 
number of large international projects, such as Capacity Building for CDM (UNEP Risoe, 2012). 
Despite these efforts, only 14 Letters of Approval were issued and only one project was registered 
by the end of 2007, indicating the difficulties that CDM consultancy companies faced moving their 
projects forward. According to Nguyen et al. (2011) – and confirmed by our interviews – some of the 
                                                          
5
 Research Center for Energy and Environment, NIRAS combines the names of the two founders of the company. 
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key problems during this first period were "regulatory barriers for approval process, bureaucracy and 
corruption, and tariff uncertainty barriers for project developers, barriers of access to information and 
local capacity, and barriers due to type of projects" (p. 229). 
Take-off phase (2008-2013) 
From 2008, the CDM in Vietnam finally took off, for a number of interrelated reasons. First, the 
consultants operating in Vietnam understood better how to navigate the barriers they had experienced 
before and the government also began to recognise the potential financial benefits. Secondly, the price 
of CERs provided a clear incentive: it was over €20/tCO2 during the first half of 2008, before reducing to 
around €10-13/tCO2 until the second half of 2011 (see Figure 4Figure). This price was driven by a strong 
demand for CERs from companies and traders in Europe, Japan and Australia before the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis. Thirdly, there was increasing experience with CDM worldwide and in Asia in particular. 
Some international companies opened offices in Vietnam, whilst others set up joint-ventures with 
Vietnamese consultancy companies. Fourthly, the demand for electricity in Vietnam continued to rise, 
resulting in the construction of a significant number of small to medium-sized hydropower projects 
(<250 MW), developed by private companies. As one consultant explained, a hydropower project of this 
size is well-suited to the CDM: they are too small to cause large – and therefore controversial – social 
and environmental impacts (at least on paper), but big enough to make them financially attractive for 
the CDM industry and the hydropower project developers. These factors resulted in a massive increase 
in the number of hydropower CDM projects in Vietnam with 199 Letters of Approval and 194 registered 
projects by the end of 2012. Consequently, Hanoi became a vibrant arena with around 10 large CDM 
consultancy companies and many smaller ones competing to benefit from the CDM industry boom (cf. 
Smits, 2013). In total, there were over 30 consultancy companies in Hanoi with at least one project 
registered and over half of them with more than two projects (UNEP Risoe, 2013). 
Collapse (2013-?) 
The end of 2012 brought a sudden end to the boom of the CDM in Vietnam. Again, a number of reasons 
can be identified. First, the end of 2012 marked the conclusion of the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto protocol and no new global agreement was reached in time. While key international actors 
decided to continue with the CDM, there were a number of important changes. First, the EU – by far 
the biggest buyer of CERs – decided to buy credits from Least Developed Countries only, thus excluding 
Vietnam. Furthermore, Japan – another important player in CDM in Vietnam – decided at the end of 
2010 not to extend the Kyoto protocol beyond 2012 (Valentine et al., 2011). Secondly, too many 
projects generating CERs had been created, in particular in China, that exceeded demand due to the 
ongoing effects of the 2008 global financial crisis alongside uncertainty about the future of the 
mechanism. Consequently, the price of CERs dropped from €10-13/tCO2in 2011 to around €5/tCO2 at 
the start of 2012 and finally to less than €1/tCO2 in 2013 (Point Carbon, 2013). This price has made it 
essentially impossible for CDM consultants to develop CDM projects and many of them had to close 
their offices in Vietnam or merge with other companies, reducing the number of CDM consulting 
companies. Those that remained by mid-2013 were the bigger companies offering a range of 
consultancy services besides CDM. The Vietnam Energy and Environmental Consultancy (VNEEC), the 
company with the most CDM projects in Vietnam, cut the number of their staff from around 40 to five 
by August 2013. Intraco reduced its CDM staff from 15 to just three persons, while Blue World Carbon 
went from 10 persons to one by August 2013, just for monitoring their existing projects. The arena in 
Hanoi disappeared almost as quickly as it had emerged. 
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Figure 4. Development of CER spot price in €/tCO2 from 2008 until October 2013. 
 
Source: Point Carbon (2013). 
It is difficult to predict whether the CDM – or a similar mechanism – will make a comeback in the near 
future. Throughout 2013, there were still projects trickling in, albeit very few compared to the numbers 
of the years before. Meanwhile, there are ongoing international negotiations about improving or 
reforming CDM and the introduction of new market mechanisms (CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012; 
Michaelowa, 2011). 
ARENAS OF CDM AND WATER GOVERNANCE IN VIETNAM 
Having outlined the boom and bust of CDM in Vietnam, this section of the article applies the water 
governance framework to the situation in Vietnam. The focus is on the identification of climate finance-
water governance arenas. This section also serves as the basis for the analysis of two project case 
studies in the penultimate section of the article that explores pre-existing and new arenas of 
engagement in water governance. 
Table 2Table provides an overview of the different steps in the CDM cycle, the actors involved and 
the arenas where decisions are made with a focus on place and 'scale'. To reiterate, we see arenas as 
physical or virtual places where actors interact in official and unofficial processes that lead to decisions 
and outcomes. 
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Table 2. Different steps in the CDM cycle, key actors (officially), other actors and arenas. Adapted from 
UNFCCC (2013b).  
Step in CDM cycle  Key actor officially in 
arena 
Other actors present in 
the arena 
Place ('scale') of the 
arena 
1. Project design Developer Consultants (lead actor in 
practice), affected people, 
civil society organisations 
Hanoi ('national') and 
Internet ('global') 
2. National 
approval 
Designated National 
Authority in host and 
Annex I country 
Other ministries Hanoi ('national') 
3. Validation (of 
the project) 
Designated Operational 
Entity (A) 
Consultants, affected 
people 
International cities 
('global') and project 
('local') 
4. Registration UNFCCC Executive Board  Bonn (UNFCCC) and 
Internet ('global') 
5. Monitoring (of 
the project) 
Designated Operational 
Entity (B) 
Consultants Project ('local') 
6. Verification (of 
the credits) 
Designated Operational 
Entity (B) 
Consultants International cities 
('global') and project 
('local') 
7. CER issuance Executive Board  Bonn (UNFCCC) ('global') 
One of the most important arenas for CDM in Vietnam is the one representing the 'national' scale, 
which in Vietnam has its material base in Hanoi and to a lesser extent in Ho Chi Minh City. This is the 
scale at which several actors operate, such as the Designated National Authority (DNA),6 consultants, 
the national state-owned utility Electricité du Vietnam (EVN), and some private and state-owned 
project developers. As Table 2Table shows, this is the main arena for the first two steps of the cycle. In 
theory, the project developers initiate the CDM process and come up with a Project Design Document 
(PDD).7 In practice, however, this is initiated and prepared by the private consultants. They search for 
new projects with the potential for CDM-eligibility through their networks or through the Power 
Development Plan (PDP), a key government planning document for the power sector. Once they have 
identified a project, they talk to the developers seeking to convince them to start the CDM. The reward 
for the consultants is that they can negotiate a share of the benefit from selling the credits, which 
depends on the size of the project and a fixed or floating carbon credits price. 
Physically, the 'national arena' is largely situated in the (air-conditioned) offices in or near the centre 
of Hanoi. These offices stand in sharp contrast to the rest of the city and to the areas where the actual 
project development takes place. These offices are also central to the second step in the CDM process, 
which is where the approval process by national governments takes place. In Vietnam, there are 16 
representatives from 14 different ministries and one science association involved in this process. The 
                                                          
6
 The DNA is an organisation within a ministry, which is responsible for processing CDM projects. In Vietnam, the DNA is part of 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE), Department of Meteorology, Hydrology and Climate Change. 
7
 The PDD is a document setting out the key parameters of the CDM project, such as the baseline, calculations of additionality 
and sustainable development implications. 
Water Alternatives - 2014  Volume 7 | Issue 3 
Smits and Middleton: The boom and bust of hydropower CDM projects in Vietnam Page | 571 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) hosts the DNA and therefore has the lead in 
this process. 
The project level or 'local' scale is another important arena, albeit more so in theory than in practice. 
Important actors in this arena are the project developers, construction companies, local governments 
(provincial, district, village) and affected people. The local arenas are important for the various 
Measurement, Reporting and Validation (MRV)8 processes of the CDM as well as local consultation 
processes (UNFCCC, 2013a). The former are covered by steps three, five and six, while the consultation 
processes are part of the first step, the development of the PDD (Table 2). Physically, the consultation 
processes take place in meeting rooms at different government levels, while MRV processes are 
conducted at the site of construction. The consultations are meant to ensure that local people and 
governments are informed and have a chance to influence the project. 
The 'global' scale is also place-based, namely in Bonn, where the Executive Board of the UNFCCC is 
located. This place is very important for the functioning of the mechanism and in particular for steps 
four and seven in the process. They exert important influence over other actors through network 
governance, and are responsible for the institutionalisation of many tools and other rationalities into 
the articulation of CDM in the water governance framework (Lövbrand, 2009). 
A final arena is the Internet as 'global public sphere' where information flows are in principle free 
and open for access by anyone. For CDM, this is mainly in the form of the publication of certain 
documents and opening for comments during the 30-day comment period. In principle, the Internet 
could be used more broadly to compare the social and environmental impact between projects and 
exchange of information between civil society organisations. However, as mentioned above, access and 
knowledge are two important limiting factors, because the CDM is rendered highly technical. 
INSIDE THE CDM PROCESS IN VIETNAM: CASE STUDIES IN QUANG NAM 
Having mapped the articulation of CDM processes with water governance in Vietnam, this section 
presents two hydropower CDM project case studies in Nam Giang District, Quang Nam Province, 
Vietnam (Figure 5Figure), namely Song Bung 2 and the Song Bung 4. 
Song Bung 4 was selected due to its contested nature and the involvement of the Asian 
Development Bank as multinational actor, whilst in contrast Song Bung 2 was selected due to its 
relatively uncontested nature. In both cases, a reasonable amount of information had been published 
by the companies themselves, the ADB (the financier of Song Bung 4) and NGOs active on these 
projects. In terms of the water governance framework (Dore et al., 2012), the actors, power and politics 
in the various arenas for the two projects are quite different; for both cases, we link the field-based 
findings of the case studies at the local level to interviews conducted at the national arena 'scale' and 
analysis of the global-scale processes, drawing out issues related to power and politics in the CDM 
finance-water governance nexus. 
Quang Nam is one of the poorest and least densely populated provinces in Vietnam (Table 3Table), 
but is well-endowed with natural resources and hydropower potential in particular; the province – and 
Nam Giang District in particular – harbours one of the highest densities of (proposed) hydropower 
projects of the country. The province had approved 44 hydropower projects with a total capacity of 
almost 1600 MW by 2013 (Thanh Nien News, 2013). As a result, transmission lines now dominate the 
hilly-cum-mountainous terrain, alongside rivers and upland rice cultivation. 
                                                          
8
 The term MRV was introduced during the Bali round in 2007 to standardise and increase the transparency of mitigation 
activities (Mucci, 2012).  
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Figure 5. Map of Vietnam showing the location of Quang Nam Province and Nam Giang District. 
 
 
 
 
Water Alternatives - 2014  Volume 7 | Issue 3 
Smits and Middleton: The boom and bust of hydropower CDM projects in Vietnam Page | 573 
Table 3. Some key statistics on Vietnam and Quang Nam (GSO, 2009). 
 Area (km²) Population Population  
density (/km²) 
% Urban Forest 
coverage (%) 
Vietnam  331,200 85,847,000 260 32.5 39.5 
Quảng Nam  
Province 
10,440 1,422,000 136 18.6 48.2 
Hydropower is increasingly controversial in Vietnam and discussions on it have become more open. 
Examples from the national media are the Dong Nai 6 and 6A dams, which were planned in the middle 
of Cat Tien National Park and would affect a large number of people living in, or depending on, the 
watershed area (CleanBiz Asia, 2013; Wells-Dang, 2013). In Quang Nam itself, the 190 MW Song Tranh 2 
dam gained nationwide attention because of a series of earthquakes in 2012 allegedly caused by the 
dam (Vietnam Times, 2013). Dams in Central Vietnam have also been linked to major flood-events in 
which dozens of people were killed (Viet Nam News, 2011; Chi, 2013) although EVN has disputed this 
(Viet Nam News, 2013). In addition to the concerns about safety and social and environmental impacts, 
hydropower projects progressed slowly since the economic crisis in 2008 including due to the lower-
than-expected profits from hydropower for IPPs. Therefore, the government of Quang Nam Province 
proposed to suspend 18 hydropower projects, 11 of which were located in Nam Giang District in 2012. 
According to the deputy chairwoman of the Peopleʼs Committee of Nam Giang District, the construction 
of dams has led to "public disorder" because "[o]pening roads to facilitate the plant construction have 
accidentally created favourable conditions for illegal gold exploiters to increase their activities" (Viet 
Nam News, 2012). 
In total, 15 CDM hydropower projects in Quang Nam Province have been registered – including Song 
Bung 2 and 4 – and one was under validation as of October 2013. Not all projects in the province have 
applied for CDM, because some of them were already under construction before the CDM was 
implemented, while others are too small (i.e. not yielding enough revenues) to be of interest for the 
consultants. 
The 100 MW Song Bung 2 hydropower dam is – at the time of writing – under construction and set 
to be finished by 2016. The developer is EVN, a state-owned company. The US$175 million project is 
financed through loans from three international banks: Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (Japan), 
Société Générale (France), and BNP Paribas (France). According to the PDD, the project reduces 233,000 
tCO2 per year over 7 years (UNFCCC, 2012a). At a price of $10/tCO2, this would be worth over $2 
million/year. By the end of 2012 (at around $0.20/tCO2), however, it was worth less than $50,000/year. 
This points to the great levels of variation and uncertainty, which is why banks do not want to 
incorporate income from CDM when granting loans (05-08-2013, Hanoi). 
The 190 MW Song Bung 4 hydropower dam is also developed by EVN. Construction commenced in 
2010 and is expected to be completed by early 2015. Song Bung 4 is anticipated to have higher social 
and environmental impacts than Song Bung 2 (see below), and has a higher international profile due to 
the involvement of the ADB, for whom it is their first hydropower project in Vietnam. Besides providing 
a US$267 million loan, the ADB is heavily involved in Song Bung 4 through the provision of technical 
assistance, monitoring and evaluation, and also by promoting the project to the development 
community through short videos and feature articles (ADB, 2011-2013). This project would reduce 
224,000 tCO2/year over 7 years (UNFCCC, 2012b). Despite its higher capacity, this amount is less than 
the Song Bung 2, because its bigger reservoir results in higher project emissions. 
Both projects have separate managements units that manage the day-to-day activities of the 
projects. 
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Social and environmental impact in the CDM and in practice 
The social and environmental impact of the Song Bung 2 project is relatively limited because of its small 
reservoir (2.8 km2) and isolated location. Environmental impacts include the clearing of the forest and 
pollution during the construction phase. The main social impacts are the flooding of agricultural fields 
of 26 households and the relocation of some houses due to the construction of a new access road in the 
nearby village. In total, the developer provided 14 billion VND (~US$670,000)9 to compensate for these 
impacts, following Vietnamese laws and regulations. 
The social and environmental impacts of the Song Bung 4 project, in contrast, are substantial. The 
reservoir size is 15.7 km2 and is much bigger than the Song Bung 2. It also has involved the resettlement 
of four complete villages and the flooding of their (swidden) agricultural lands and areas for hunting 
and gathering. An extensive plan was prepared for compensation in accordance with both Vietnamʼs 
laws and the ADBʼs safeguard policy. Each of the households received a monetary compensation 
(depending on the size of their house and land): 0.04 ha to build a new house, 0.06 ha for a garden and 
1.5 ha for sedentary farming. This amounted to a total monetary value of around 300 billion VND 
(~US$14.3M). In addition, new facilities (roads, schools, meeting places) were constructed and a 
programme to reconstruct peopleʼs livelihoods was initiated. This meant a big change for the people 
who used to live in challenging conditions, far from the roads, with little monetary income, and largely 
dependent on swidden agriculture, hunting and fishing. 
Remarkably, the PDD of the CDM application for Song Bung 4 does not mention the resettlement of 
the four villages as a social impact, and only lists some of the environmental impacts. This typifies an 
increasingly documented politics of knowledge associated with CDM projects and their reporting, in 
which potentially 'difficult' information is strategically omitted, as stated by some consultants 
interviewed. On the other hand, in the ADB documentation, with its extensive safeguard policies, it is 
rather the opposite, and social impacts are extensively detailed, including their proposed mitigation. 
Yet here the resettlement is rendered technical in many voluminous reports detailing the nature and 
procedures for compensation, which may in the end not transform into planned outcomes on the 
ground. The networked governance of CDM, with its emphasis on carbon accounting and lack of 
guidance on 'sustainable development', facilitates these different (and deficit) representations of social 
impacts. After all, the CDM Executive Board is located far away in an Annex-I country, and is both 
physically and mentally very far removed from the dirt and cement involved in the construction of 
hydropower projects. 
Despite their efforts, the ADB received a lot of criticism from civil society organisations on their 
involvement with the Song Bung 4, because of the high social and environmental impacts of the project, 
as well as the prominent public profile of the ADB and the project. The Vietnam Rivers Network (VRN) 
in particular has been very active in scrutinising the ADB on the amount of compensation and limited 
opportunities for rebuilding livelihoods of the people (VRN, 2012). Many of the VRNʼs observations 
were verified by our own local interviews, which showed that – while people are generally happy with 
their new houses and facilities – they have very limited means to cultivate land for food and generate 
additional income. Many of the livelihood projects have failed; almost all the livestock provided have 
died; the soils of the gardens are poor; 'irrigated paddy fields' have been dry from the start; and the 
new plots of agricultural land are too small for traditional upland swidden cultivation. At the time of 
fieldwork, most of the people were living off their compensation money which is expected to run out in 
the next few years. None of the people in the affected villages have managed to find work at the 
construction sites of the Song Bung 2 or Song Bung 4, despite the promise in the PDD of (an 
                                                          
9
 We use an exchange rate of US$1.00= VND21,000 and round figures. 
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unquantified amount of) local employment. Instead, the work is carried out by hundreds of Chinese and 
Vietnamese workers, who are hired by the Chinese subcontractors. 
Through their efforts, the local civil society organisations are contesting how the ADB has rendered 
the resettlement process for the Song Bung 4 technical, i.e. their strict and elaborate compensation and 
participation protocols and – at the same time – their positive representation of this process to the 
outside world through online videos and feature stories. Civil society organisations are contesting these 
processes by undertaking their own research and posting reports of their findings on their own 
websites, and also sending letters to the multilateral organisation. However, currently they have not 
used the spaces of engagement in the CDM-related arenas, such as the 30-day comment period or the 
stakeholder consultations. Our interviews show that the main reason is that they are not aware of 
these spaces. Moreover, these spaces remain hard to access and the impact of using these means is at 
best unclear. In addition, their power to confront the ADB is limited because of the political space in 
Vietnam (Wells-Dang, 2013) and the ability of the ADB to control discourses in the international arena, 
for example, through releasing videos and other promotional materials. The situation is also markedly 
different from the Song Bung 2, which has not received any scrutiny from civil society organisations, 
because of its smaller social impacts and lower international profile. 
This section has provided an examination of the social and environmental impact of the Song Bung 2 
and Song Bung 4 and their articulation through CDM, as well as the involvement of some of the actors. 
The bottom line is that the requirements for sustainable development are undefined by the UNFCCC 
and also weakly articulated by the national DNA of Vietnam. On top of this, the weak environmental 
governance context in Vietnam renders the few statements on social and environmental impact and 
improvement written into the CDM documentation essentially meaningless. In other words, despite 
CDM being an 'international process', 'international standards' of sustainable development still do not 
apply. 
Additionality in the CDM and in practice 
From the PDD, it seems that CDM has not played a major role in making the Song Bung 2 project 
'additional', i.e. actually needing the climate finance to realise the project. According to the time line – a 
compulsory element of each project – the Feasibility Study for this project was completed in November 
2005 and the Environmental Impact Assessment in 2006. However, CDM was only first considered in 
December 2009, which is less than 20 days before the approval of the total investment (UNFCCC, 
2012a). Moreover, the loan agreement with the three international banks was signed three months 
before the letter of intent to start CDM was issued. Furthermore, an analyst of one of the international 
banks that finances hydropower in Vietnam (05-08-2013, Hanoi) mentioned that CDM finance was not 
an important consideration for their bank, because the revenues are too risky and too low. 
At first sight, the Song Bung 4 projectʼs time line in the PDD suggests that CDM was considered 
before the loan agreement was signed and was a crucial element in the decision-making process 
(UNFCCC, 2012b). An interview with a senior energy project officer at ADB (07-08-2013, Hanoi), 
however, revealed that the project would have proceeded regardless, with or without CDM. This was 
corroborated by an interview with a representative of the Song Bung 4 management board (05-08-
2013, Hanoi), who mentioned that they were hardly aware of the CDM and left this work to the private 
consultants (in this case ADB CDM facility and EVN Finance). Their organisation had not invested any 
money in the CDM process, instead leaving the responsibility and cost to the consultants and the 
prospective buyers of the credits. 
From other interviews with CDM consultants, we found out that it is common practice for 
hydropower developers themselves in Vietnam to be little involved or interested in the CDM, both for 
lack of knowledge and also the relatively low financial gains (compared to the overall cost of the project 
and future revenue streams). The expert technical knowledge required to operate in the national and 
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international arenas of CDM is also not possessed by the developers. Therefore, even if they wanted to, 
the extent to which CDM is rendered technical prohibits developersʼ direct involvement to a large 
degree, thus reinforcing the role of – indeed, need for – the consultants. 
Consultations meetings 
For both the Song Bung 2 and the Song Bung 4, consultation meetings for the CDM were documented 
to have been held at different levels of government: provincial, district and locally in the villages. The 
purpose of these meetings is to inform the local government and population about the proposed 
project, its social and environmental impacts, and the CDM process. They are seen as an important 
moment for response from local stakeholders. However, it was very difficult to find anyone who 
remembers attending these meetings – both in the different government departments and at village 
level – let alone to say something about the process and degree of participation. This could simply be 
because we failed to find the right people to talk to. It could also be because the meetings were held a 
few years before our fieldwork, in 2008 in case of the Song Bung 4 and in 2011 for the Song Bung 2. 
Alternatively, it could be that the meeting did not make a big impression on those who attended. 
Indeed, many of them mentioned having been part of dozens of meetings about the construction of the 
dams, the level of compensation, the livelihoods reconstruction project, and other issues. 
In general, we found that consultation meetings are often treated as another box to tick, and local 
people and governments have very limited understanding of why they are consulted and how CDM 
relates to their situation. In the PDD, any critical comments can easily be omitted from the document. 
Indeed, as one consultant mentioned (08-08-2013, Hanoi), one of the main strategies is to keep the 
part of the public consultation in the PDD as short as possible in order to avoid critical comments from 
the UNFCCC Executive Board. Although a full report of the meeting must be attached to the submitted 
PDD, this section is not open to public review. In other words, the engagement in the local arena, which 
is the principle scale for affected people, is very limited and ultimately lacks transparency and 
accountability. Indeed, as mentioned by some consultants, stakeholder comments are often 'edited' by 
the consultants, leaving out or downplaying negative comments. In this case, this can be attributed to 
(dis)incentives of network governance for full accountability at the local level. 
In conclusion, the investigation of two hydropower projects in Quang Nam Province demonstrates 
that the CDM mechanism had not had a major impact in terms of additionality or sustainable 
development outcomes for the projects, even though some aspects of the project – in particular at 
Song Bung 4 – have led to a major disruption of the livelihoods of people living in the area. Additional 
interviews with consultants, developers, and civil servants as well as the consultation of grey and 
academic literature, confirmed that many of the issues flagged in this section are commonplace in CDM 
projects all over Vietnam and indeed globally. Paradoxically, the closer we get to the project locations, 
the less people seem to understand what the CDM is and what benefits it is supposed to bring to them. 
This reflects the uneven access to knowledge and power distribution within the networked governance 
of the CDM mechanism, where the emphasis is on rendering CO2 technical and accountable, whilst 
leaving the definition of sustainable development ambiguous and therefore downplaying the 
importance of its operationalisation in local contexts. 
NEW ARENAS OF ENGAGEMENT IN WATER GOVERNANCE? 
This article shows that the CDM has been largely irrelevant to achieving its twin objectives in Vietnam, 
namely: additionality and sustainable development. The financing is small relative to total project costs 
and too late, and not at the core of project development. In other words, CDM has little leverage over 
projects. Others have also reached this conclusion in other contexts and for other energy technologies 
(e.g. Newell and Bumpus, 2012; Bluemling and Mol, 2013; Rindefjäll et al., 2011; Paulsson, 2009). 
However, the arenas of engagement associated with CDM, and its articulation with water governance, 
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have received far less attention despite their potential significance; this is especially the case for 
countries such as Vietnam because of the limited media freedom, transparency, and space for civil 
society. In this section, we return to the question whether there is potential for CDM to provide spaces 
for democratisation of water governance within the earlier identified arenas (Table 2Table). We ask the 
following: How accessible are these arenas? Who can engage with them? What types of knowledge – 
technical, linguistic, or otherwise – are required? 
Spaces of engagement in the local arena 
In the 'local' or project-level arena, the CDM has the potential to open up new spaces of engagement, 
as it is a formal requirement that stakeholder consultations are carried out. Again, the costs are often 
borne by the consultants or the prospective buyers, and not by the developers. While – as far as we can 
assess – these consultations are undertaken as required in Vietnam, they did not open new spaces 
within which actors could effectively make a difference in terms of project decision-making and 
outcomes. Our findings for the cases of the Song Bung 2 and the Song Bung 4 projects show that people 
do not even remember joining the consultation meetings, although some pictures on the Song Bung 2 
website indicate that some of them have joined these meetings. Many CDM consultants also stated 
that they do not see the added value because they claim that at the consultations local people are 
there principally to give input on the sustainable development component of the CDM process. Instead, 
these consultants find that local people use the meetings to register their complaints about other 
issues, such as compensation arrangements. In addition, the meetings usually reflect existing power 
relations in the communities, as the village leaders are oftentimes doing most of the talking. 
Furthermore, the reporting of the consultations in the PDD is very minimal, making it all too easy to 
omit critical comments heard in the consultations themselves. All these issues are related to the broad 
and therefore vague guidelines of the UNFCCC, requiring that "comments by local stakeholders have 
been invited, a summary of the comments received has been provided, and a report to the designated 
operational entity on how due account was taken of any comments has been received" (UNFCCC, 
2014). 
Another important observation regarding the consultation meetings from the case studies is that 
CDM is 'not the only show in town'. Instead, it is part of a bigger process of hydropower development 
and water governance, involving a range of processes, rules, actors, and institutions. As a new and 
relatively insignificant process within this wider melee, it is unlikely to have a significant impact upon 
local water governance dynamics and power relations. 
In addition to the lack of awareness amongst local people of the CDM is the 'lag of awareness' in the 
local government offices we observed as a result of CDMʼs network governance. This lag refers to the 
distance from the national arena in Hanoi to the local government levels. Whereas there is a lot of 
knowledge in the different consultancy organisations and to a lesser extent at the DNA, there is much 
less knowledge and awareness about CDM at provincial and district government levels. This confirms 
that much of the capacity-building activities focus on private actors on the national and international 
level, and much less on the different levels of local government. A striking example was the fact that 
the department of internal security of Quang Nam Province had just assigned an officer to map out the 
developments and possibilities for the government to engage with CDM at the time of fieldwork in 
August 2013, more than half a year after CDMʼs 'bust'. This, and the fact that many other local 
government officials asked us as researchers for information (rather than the other way around), is a 
clear indication that information and knowledge about CDM are highly uneven. This also results in 
asymmetrical distribution of benefits in the networked governance arrangements of CDM, as local 
people and governments see very little benefit from the mechanism. 
CDM has the potential to make a difference in terms of opening up spaces of engagement in water 
governance arenas through its requirements for public disclosure of project-related information. The 
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Song Bung 2 project is a good example here; the project has a surprisingly complete website in 
Vietnamese with regular updates, including updates on the CDM process.10 This is probably at least 
partly related to the involvement of three international banks, because there are only a few other 
hydropower companies operating in Vietnam providing similar levels of information and public 
disclosure through project websites. 
There is also anecdotal evidence of some developers publicising how they have used revenues from 
CDM to construct public buildings, such as libraries and meeting places. Some consultants mentioned 
that they try to make developers aware that the CDM lifts their projects to the 'international stage', 
which means that they have to be more careful about following rules and avoiding negative publicity. 
Finally, there are many ongoing projects but only a limited number of civil society organisations that 
have the capacity to monitor them and engage in the local arenas where necessary. Besides capacity 
issues, a key challenge remains the limited knowledge of both local civil society and government actors 
on CDM and the strong hierarchical power relations in Vietnam, limiting bottom-up involvement in 
decision-making processes (Wells-Dang, 2013). 
Spaces of engagement in the national arena 
On the 'national level', i.e. in Hanoi, there are also a number of possible new spaces of engagement that 
have opened through CDMʼs articulation with water governance. The first one is through the PDD. This 
document should contain all the information about how the project satisfies the additionality and 
sustainable development objectives of CDM. Unfortunately, the major part of this document is usually 
devoted to calculations about additionality which are hard to follow by anyone who is not a CDM 
expert, rendering the process highly technical. Even project developers themselves often do not really 
know what the CDM requirements are, as this is all left to consultants. Conversely, the section 
regarding socioeconomic and environmental impacts is often very short, generic, and covered in the 
last few pages of the PDD. Potentially controversial aspects are often excluded, such as the example of 
resettlement, in case of the Song Bung 4 hydropower project, shows. One consultant (08-08-2013, 
Hanoi) mentioned that this is a deliberate strategy, because the criteria for sustainable development 
are not very clear, and – more importantly – the more they include, the higher the chance they will 
then receive difficult questions to answer from the UNFCCC. The social and environmental impact 
sections could therefore be seen as spaces of simplification, which paint a much brighter picture than is 
often the case on the ground. 
Another important space for engagement in the national arena is around the Designated National 
Authority itself. Since specifying the criteria for sustainable development is left to this authority, they 
have the potential to set stringent criteria. However, as documented in other countries (see e.g. 
Rindefjäll et al., 2011), the Vietnamese DNA does not have clear sustainable development criteria 
because they mainly see it as a business opportunity. In fact, in an interview (07-08-2013, Hanoi), a 
senior representative of the DNA told us that they want projects to just follow the existing laws and 
regulations in Vietnam and of the CDM. Even if they wanted to, it would probably be difficult for the 
DNA to move towards more stringent sustainable development criteria because of limited knowledge 
and human resources. Many consultants stated that it was they, rather than the DNA, who had more 
detailed and up-to-date information regarding the CDM, and that the DNA just approves projects. 
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 http://www.sb2.vn/, accessed on 3 September 2014. 
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Spaces of engagement in the international arena 
At the 'international' level, there are also several spaces of engagement for water governance through 
CDM. The UNFCCC website, which links place-based governance with the 'placeless' Internet, is at first 
sight a potentially powerful database and space for public engagement. However, the website is not 
easy to use, does not include all information (e.g. reports of stakeholder consultations), and requires 
expert knowledge to read documents such as the PDD.11 The fact that the website is only available in 
English is also a restricting factor. Furthermore, the possibility to comment on projects 30 days prior to 
the request for registration is little known, cumbersome, and consequently not often used by those 
who might like to use it, such as civil society groups. Beside the UNFCCC website, the website of the 
DNA in Vietnam provides additional opportunities for engagement. This website not only contains lists 
of the PDDs, but also of the initial Project Idea Notes (PIN), which do not feature on the UNFCCC 
website. Unfortunately, the website is hard to find and only the titles of the projects (in English) can be 
found, with very little additional information, let alone space for comments.12 
Our interviews (08-08-2013 and 09-08-2013, Hanoi) show that civil society organisations involved in 
water governance in Vietnam – such as interviewed members of the Vietnam Rivers Network – were 
not aware that over 200 hydropower projects in their country are registered under the CDM. Moreover, 
they had very limited awareness of the opportunity to comment on controversial projects, such as the 
Song Bung 4, through the CDM processes, including in these international arenas. They agreed that it 
could be a potential further avenue to raise concerns about projects that they are monitoring, in 
addition to the letters they have written to ADB and the reports published on their websites. 
A final space of engagement is the possibility of CER buyers engaging in water governance through 
CDM. The EU has had a requirement since 2004 for projects over 20 MW to commission an 
independent World Commission on Dams (WCD) compliance report, intended to ensure the social and 
environmental sustainability of each project. This requirement potentially opens up a significant space 
of engagement, given that the original WCD (2000) report was influential in drawing attention to the 
negative impacts of large hydropower projects worldwide. Such a WCD compliance report needs to 
address all the seven strategic priorities outlined in chapter 8 of the original WCD report: Gaining Public 
Acceptance, Comprehensive Options Assessment, Addressing Existing Dams, Sustaining Rivers and 
Livelihoods, Recognising Entitlements and Sharing Benefits, Ensuring Compliance, Sharing Rivers for 
Peace, and Development and Security. 
In practice, however, there are several barriers that limit this potential and the required report 
seems to be a watered-down version of the original WCD guidelines. One of the key problems is that 
the WCD compliance report comes at a very late stage in the process. The CDM process does not 
require having a buyer upfront, so it could take a long time – in theory until the project starts 
generating credits (around two years after it is commissioned) – before the WCD compliance report is 
finally produced. In the case of the Song Bung 4, the consultant was still working on the report at the 
time of fieldwork in August 2013, less than 1.5 years before the scheduled commissioning of the dam 
and much too late to change anything in the construction, resettlement or any other plans. Another 
major problem of the WCD compliance report is that the report remains confidential, which makes it 
very difficult for outsiders to verify its findings. A consultant (09-08-2013) told us that it is possible to 
make a WCD compliance report on the basis of existing information in the PDD and the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA), in which case it does not contribute any added value. 
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www.noccop.org.vn/modules.php?name=Airvariable_Projects&file=index&opcase=viewprocat&pro_cate_id=103&menuid=97 
(accessed on 3 September 2014) 
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The issues with the WCD compliance report relate to the wider problem of private governance, of 
which the CDM is an example (Bäckstrand, 2008). Similar to the PDD, the consultants understand that 
CER buyers want uncritical reports so that they can proceed with their purchase (cf. Lund, 2012), and 
are therefore incentivised to oblige. This is similar to the issue raised by Paulsson (2009) about the 
validation and verification stages, where the Designated Operational Entity has an incentive to come up 
with a positive report or risk being replaced. Such accountability issues need to be resolved in order for 
spaces of engagement in the international arena to be effective. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article has explored the potential for new spaces of engagement in water governance arenas that 
have been created as a result of the implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in 
hydropower projects in Vietnam. We have analysed the boom and bust of CDM in Vietnam and 
examined two projects in Quang Nam Province in detail at the various levels of CDMʼs networked 
governance. 
Our conclusion is that whilst CDM has opened up some new potential spaces of engagement in the 
various different place-based arenas, these are currently underutilised and have not had a material 
outcome in terms of strengthening water governance including the projectsʼ social and environmental 
impacts and opportunities for a range of actors to shape project decision-making. One of the key 
reasons is that CDM is a relatively minor process embedded in wider national and local water 
governance processes and is relatively uninfluential to affect them. On a positive note, the rules and 
regulations for hydropower in Vietnam have gradually improved over time, without the need for CDMʼs 
networked governance (Dao, 2010). Although they remain imperfect, hydropower CDM projects at 
least have to comply with these regulations. In practice, however, rules and regulations in Vietnam can 
still easily be circumvented and the CDM does little to change this. The second reason for the failure of 
these new arenas of engagement to gain prominence is that many processes in the mechanism are 
under-publicised, lack channels for ready engagement with local and national actors, and are also 
rendered technical. As a result, it is virtually impossible for the Vietnamese public – especially those 
affected by hydropower projects – to engage with the CDM due to the distance, the language and the 
knowledge required. Even for civil society organisations – and academics like us – it is difficult, because 
of the opaque language and the many processes that stay within closed doors. 
Our academic contribution to the ongoing debates about CDM and other climate finance 
mechanisms is to go beyond the discussions of additionality and sustainable development alone and to 
explore how CDM articulates with water governance. We believe that this approach helps to 
understand the differences between the theory and practice of networked governance mechanisms 
such as CDM (Bäckstrand, 2008). Leaving aside whether the CDM has the potential to address its 
objective of reducing carbon emissions – about which we share the scepticism of many – we find that if 
the articulation of CDM with water governance is to provide new arenas of engagement and thus 
strengthen social and environmental outcomes at the project level, then the CDM processes must be 
more accessible and accountable, less technical, and ultimately more clearly linked to actual project 
decision-making. This must entail a serious commitment to enabling affected communities and civil 
society to provide the checks and balances – expressed within the various arenas of engagement – and 
is necessary to ensure that climate finance mechanisms do not remain simply revenue streams tapped 
by consultants and project developers with few local-level or global-level benefits. 
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